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The Anatomy of
Justice in Taxation
By Walter J. Blum
and Harry Kalven, Jr.'
This is an essay on tax justice addressed to the
citizen generalist. The subject, which must have
been of concern as far back as the time when
taxes were first introduced in human affairs, is a
difficult one. In any modern society the principles for judging tax justice will necessarily be
applied to a tax system that is formidably complex and inaccessible. There is, however, a level
of judgment that the citizen can bring to bear on
these matters without first having mastered technical details. Our effort will be to map the main
issues of tax justice rather than to argue their
merits.
It is not as easy as it once may have been to
isolate tax justice from other issues of fiscal
policy. The raising of taxes was long regarded as
belonging in a compartment of its own. Taxes
were generally thought of as the indispensable
method of financing government; what the government did with the tax money afterward was
not seen as relevant to assessing the justice of how
it was raised. But in recent years at least four
factors have served to soften this stark image of
taxation. These are (1) the increasing share of
the national income that is spent through government, (2) the wider range of functions performed by government, including making of
welfare or transfer payments, (3) the deliberate
use of taxation as one form of government intervention to accomplish social objectives, and (4)
the greater awareness we now have of the possibilities of controlling deliberately the value of
money-of bringing about inflation or deflation.
Although concerns about taxation are increasingly linked to these other aspects of fiscal opera*Mr. Blum Is Professor of Law and Mr. Kalven, Harry A. Bigelow
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law SchooL This
essay is reprinted with the permission of The Great Ideas, 1973
and Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
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tions, it is still profitable to pursue certain issues
of policy as distinctively attached to the concept
of tax justice.

I Locating taxation
To locate ourselves analytically, it may help to
begin by juxtaposing taxation and charity. On
the surface, the decisive difference is that tax contributions are exacted by legal compulsion, while
charitable contributions are not. But the similarities nevertheless are arresting. Like tax moneys,
funds for charity are devoted to nonprivate, community purposes. Where the habit and practice
of charity are strong, as in certain religious communities, the compulsion to give may be formidable. Even more striking, there are explicit
standards or canons of "proper" giving. It is reported that in early history, subjection to taxation was sometimes deemed inappropriate for
aristocrats and seen as a badge of inferiority: the
aristocrat was allowed, and expected, to make his
contributions voluntarily. Common speech, too,
offers its insight. With reference to charity, we
talk about the quality of the individual donorsthey are magnanimous, niggardly, and so on;
with reference to taxation, we talk about the
quality of the law-it is just or unjust.
If the element of coercion makes it easy to distinguish taxation from charity, the same element
makes it awkward to distinguish the coercion of
taxation from confiscation. It is a fundamental
principle of our society, enshrined in constitutions, that private property cannot be taken for
public purposes by the state without just compensation; yet these same constitutions explicitly
confer the power to tax. The similarity is obvious: there is a taking by the state without compensation in both cases. But the difference is
more troublesome to isolate than one would expect. It appears to reside essentially in the difference between taking money and taking specific
property. What is surprising is that this difference becomes so value laden; taxation is at least
a neutral word, while confiscation is pejorative in
the extreme. Perhaps the answer is that the
4

taking of specific property by the state is more
intrusive than the creation of obligations to be
satisfied in money; perhaps it is implausible that
specific property is being taken to pay for the
operations of government; perhaps it is suspected
that the taking of property will be not systematic
or disciplined by principle. But these clues may
on occasion fail to keep taxation and confiscation
clearly apart. Taxes can be set so high that the
taxpayer is forced to dispose of specific property
or simply turn it over to government in order to
satisfy his tax obligation. This perception is at
the core of the notion of confiscatory taxation.
Indeed, revolutionary regimes have sometimes
used the format of 100 percent taxation as the
very vehicle of confiscation.
As we can distinguish taxation from charitable
donations and public confiscation, so we can distinguish it from the purchase of services from
government. The postal system furnishes, or did
until recently, an example sufficient for our purposes. The classic postal service provided a model
that appeared to have avoided all issues of tax
justice. Supplying mail delivery throughout the
country was widely thought to be an essential
governmental function. The postal system like
other government services could have been wholly
financed out of general tax revenues, as in part it
was whenever the receipts did not cover all operating expenses. What was underwritten was a
government activity that provided pervasive benefits throughout the society, since everyone benefited to some degree by the availability of a postal
network. But in the main this network was financed by selling the service directly to users;
stamps stood in the place of taxes. The public
did not think of buying stamps as paying a tax
but merely as buying a service; if they were led to
see the charge as a form of taxation, they found
it perfectly fair, at least so long as postal revenues
equaled postal costs.
On a closer look one could, however, detect
elements of tax justice. Had receipts exceeded
postal costs while the government kept a monopoly on the service, the excess would have been
5

a tax. Such an excess would put in issue the
justice of raising taxes from postal users as a
group. Moreover, postal surplus or deficit apart,
to the extent that rates for various classes of
services were not set strictly according to costs,
one could not escape issues of justice among
classes of users, again mirroring issues of justice
among taxpayers.
The example of selling essential government
services invites the question of how far the same
strategy could be used to replace taxes. Could the
government, to take an obvious example, sell
police protection the way it sold mail delivery?
No modern state seems ever to have experimented with the possibility, and for more than
one sufficient reason. There would be administrative difficulties in estimating what to charge
various groups; there would be the inescapable
free-rider problem once a large number had
elected to buy protection; there would be the
awkwardness of requiring the very poor to pay
for protection or go without it; and there would
be the spillover effects in the larger community
if any sector refused to buy police protection or
were unable to do so. Some taxes, rather than
user charges, are apparently necessary if government is to function.
It was once argued on the basis of so-called
benefit theory that if we could not literally employ voluntary charges for government service,
we should do the next best thing. The proposal
was to apportion taxes on the basis of estimates
of total benefits received from government. But
benefit theory turned out to share most of the
difficulties of relying directly on user charges,
especially the embarrassment of fixing the proper
charge on the poor. And upon serious scrutiny,
most government services conferred benefits in
too diffuse a fashion to permit the formulation
of a tax schedule based upon them.
There nevertheless remains vitality to the related position that, whenever possible, particular
government services should be financed by selling
them to the users, thus minimizing any issues of
tax justice. Financing such services via taxation,
6

it is urged, must necessarily yield a less fair way
of allocating that burden. Some have carried this
theme a step further and argued that any service
that could be financed by a user charge thereby
proves itself not to be a government service,
strictly speaking; it should either be ceded to
the private sphere or turned over to a "self-sustaining" public corporation, which is indeed the
intended fate today of the postal service.
The point is that while we all agree that taxes
are the price we pay for government and its services, there is in the end an intractable difficulty
in using this insight as a guide in allocating much
of the tax burden.
Thus far the analogies have run from other familiar concepts to taxation in order to underscore
certain characteristics of taxation. We turn now
and analogize from taxation to other institutions
in modern life, citing three instances: the military draft, land-use zoning, and inflation.
There is no doubt that, especially in peacetime,
the government could hire an army. If it did, it
would pay the total cost, presumably out of general tax revenues. By drafting its soldiers and
paying them without regard to market price, the
government meets the total cost of the venture
only partly out of general revenue, but partly
also by underpaying the soldiers drafted. This
gap in payment, since it is the result of compulsion, can be reasonably viewed as a tax on the
soldiers. We have then a tax that falls only on
a part of the population, and a part that, for tax
purposes, has been most arbitrarily selected. One
can perhaps perceive the unfairness of the draft
without utilizing the idiom of taxation, but the
perception is sharply clarified by translating it
into tax terms. No one would explicitly set up a
tax to fall only on a part of the population that,
from a tax perspective, had been so arbitrarily
chosen.
Much the same analysis holds for zoning. The
government action in zoning for land use, however beneficial overall, will operate to prevent
some property holders from utilizing their prop7

erty as they wish. The right to use the property
in some of the outlawed ways might have made it
more valuable on the market. The difference in
value of the property, prior to zoning and after
zoning, amounts to a public taking of some value
from the owner. Here too, as in the case of the
draft, the gap in values resulting from the govcrnment action can, with added insight, be described as a tax, a tax that again falls on an
arbitrarily selected fraction of the population.
One might be led from viewing this as a tax to
the question of whether there are not some circumstances under which owners prejudiced by
zoning restrictions, justified by the general good
of the community, should be compensated for the
loss of value.
Whenever government deliberately pursues a
policy of inflation on behalf of some objective
such as stimulating the economy, we can again
detect what is in effect a tax at work. The burden
imposed by inflation is obscured by the fact that
a rise in price levels is accompanied by a rise in
incomes, so that there appears to be a rough setoff, higher prices against higher incomes. There
are, however, many in the society for whom there
will be no compensating offset. These include
annuitants, bondholders, bank depositors, owners
of life insurance, and so forth. The gap for such
persons is between the old and the new purchasing power of their fixed income. Here again
it is reasonable to talk of the gap as a tax levied
on a fraction of the population, selected by an
altogether arbitrary criterion.
One more point is needed to locate ourselves
analytically: taxation, and therefore tax justice,
presupposes a system of private wealth. For the
government to take in taxes an amount of money
from a citizen implies that the citizen had a claim
to the money beforehand. Clearly there are some
communities in which the very idea of taxation
is alien. Consider a monastic group in which the
"income" of the members consists of that which
is furnished them by the authorities. If a need
for more revenue arises for the community, it
may be met by giving each member somewhat
8

less initially than he would otherwise have had,
rather than by taking back or taxing back something that has already been given. Taxation thus
posits a distinctive property relationship between
taxpayer and government. If nothing is as certain as death and taxes, nevertheless it seems extreme to regard the government as haling a continuing inchoate property interest in the income
and wealth of its citizens. For most of us, each
payment of taxes is a fresh event and a new taking, even when it occurs in the form of payroll
or salary deductions. Tax justice frames the issue
as one of fairness in taking something from you
rather than as fairness in not allocating to you
that something in the first place. These two kinds
of fairness need not be mirror images of each
other.

II Vertical equity
Since the essence of taxation lies in coercive
takings by government, there is always the question of how the act of taxing has affected the distribution of property or income among citizens.
The relative shares of the citizens in property or
income may have been altered when the situation
before the tax is compared with the situation
after the tax. Lurking among these rudimentary
relationships lies perhaps the central question of
tax justice.
Any tax can be characterized in one of three
ways. First, there is the tax that is regressive.
Here the distribution of property or income,
whatever it was before the tax, is made less equal
by operation of the tax. The obvious illustration
is a tax to be levied only on the poor and not on
the more wealthy. But regressive taxes may also
include taxes that are equal in dollar amount as
between the poor and the more wealthy. A universal head tax, of a given amount, would necessarily reduce the after-tax shares of the poor as
compared with the after-tax shares of the more
wealthy.
The second type is the tax that is progressive.
Here the distribution of property or income,
whatever it was before the tax, is made more
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equal by operation of the tax. A tax on income
or wealth in which the rates are graduated upward would necessarily reduce, after taxation,
the shares of the more wealthy as compared to
the shares of the less wealthy.
The third type of tax is that which is neither
regressive nor progressive. It may be designated
"neutral" or "proportionate"; it would leave the
relative shares of property and income unchanged
before and after taxes.
While these types are readily differentiated as
models, it may prove more difficult to characterize
taxes in the real world. A particular tax, such
as an excise tax on amusements, cannot be classified in this scheme unless we know something
about the distribution of tastes for amusements.
Moreover, the regressive or progressive impact of
one tax may be offset by the progressive or regressive impact of another-as, for example, in a
combination of a sales tax and an income tax.
Further, the tax may nominally fall on one person but actually be borne by someone else. These
complexities in the incidence of total tax systems
pose genuine problems and are today sul ject to
elaborate empirical study, but they lie outside
this essay. Our discussion can proceed on three
simplifying assumptions: first, that any composite of taxes may be viewed as a coordinated
single levy; second, that the incidence of the
composite of taxes is known; and third, that we
can ignore the possibility that the composite may
not operate with the same impact throughout
the total range of property and income in the
society-in some parts of the range it may be
progressive, while in others it may be proportionate or even regressive.
Which of these three models best satisfies the
requirements of tax justice is a question of fundamental importance. Since any tax must conform to one of them, with effects that are either
regressive, progressive, or neutral, we must determine the effects we should prefer. And in the
effort to do this, we find our task simplified by
the fact that there is a wide consensus that a
regressive tax, unless justified by achievements
10

apart from its distributional effects, has effects
that are flatly unjust. The grounds of this damning judgment are evident: there is, to say the
least, enough inequality in the society to make
any attempt to increase it perverse.
But, having rejected regressive taxation out of
hand, can we with equal confidence choose between a progressive system and a neutral one-i.e.,
one that is proportionate? At first blush, the
choice might seem fairly clear. We risk the injection of no new injustices by choosing a neutral system. Since taxation, unlike most other
laws, can achieve its objective-of raising revenue-by a neutral route, it would seem compatible with justice that it do so. And yet the
most interesting chapter in the history of tax justice deals with why the case for neutrality turns
out to be so much less forceful than it initially
appears.
One obstacle that confronts this aspiration
toward tax neutrality will be readily acknowledged, once it is pointed out. It arises from the
brute fact that there is poverty in the society or,
more precisely, that there is a level of income or
resources that falls below an acceptable standard
of living. Under these circumstances, a fully
neutral tax just does not work. It simply exacerbates the social problem the poor present, and requires that the money taken from them in taxes
be returned as welfare or some other kind of
transfer payment.
Any discussion of economic equality across the
society must take into account this question of
putting a floor under inequality. Taxation involves setting a cutoff point. A tax system with
exemptions for the poor provides a relatively congenial context in which society can face up to the
fact that some government intervention on behalf
of the poor because they are poor is necessary,
and as a corollary, it provides a context for making a judgment of who we see as the poor.
This inevitable compromise of the neutrality
principle turns out to be pervasive and complex,
and the point is worth pausing for. It might be
thought that we could give the exemption only
11

to those below the cutoff point and not in any
way affect those above that line. There would be
no exemption for those taxpayers with incomes
above the line; they would pay the full rate on
their total income. But the effort to simplify
matters this way precipitates an unacceptable injustice. To illustrate, assume an exemption of
$5,000 and a flat rate of 25 percent. A man with
an income, say, of $4,000 or $4,500 or $5,000 will
pay nothing in taxes; but a man with a slightly
larger income, say, of $5,100 or $5,500 or $6,000
will end up literally worse off after taxes than
if he initially had had an income under $5,000.
Indeed, the system will find itself using a marginal rate of tax on that additional $100, $500, or
$1,000 that is over 100 percent. To avoid the injustice of this "notch" rate effect, tax systems
have almost invariably elected to give the exemption to everybody, including those who are comfortably above the cutoff point. This move eliminates the injustice, but yields an unexpected set
of consequences for those above the exemption
level.
As income above the exemption line increases,
the percentage of that income subject to the flat
tax increases; the result is that the effective rates
of tax on the total income, including the exempt
income, also increase. Assume again a $5,000
exemption and a flat 25 percent tax. A man with
a $9,000 income will pay the 25 percent tax on
$4,000-a tax of $1,000, which is 11 percent of his
total income; whereas a man with an income of
$29,000 will pay the 25 percent tax on $24,000-a
tax of $6,000, which is about 21 percent of his
total income. The higher the income the closer
the effective rate of tax will come to the flat rate
of 25 percent, though it will never exceed the
flat rate. The approach to the level of the flat
rate that results as we advance through higher
levels of income constitutes a progression. But as
the progression leads in this case to a diminishing
gap between the effective rate of tax and the flat
rate, it is technically called degression. We can
increase the range of degressive effect in such a
scheme by increasing the flat rate, or by increas12

ing the exemption level, or by doing both.
This is not a technical point; it is one that lies
close to the heart of any concern with distributive
tax justice. The logic of degression leads inexorably to some redistribution of incomes among
those above the exemption level. The important
question then becomes: does this logic imply that
the tax system can or should be used to effect a
greater redistribution of incomes among those
above the exemption level?
The answer is that it neither improves nor
worsens the case for doing this by, for example,
graduating tax rates upward above the exemption. There are significant differences between degression, on the one hand, and other progression
patterns that rest on graduated rates. Degression
has two built-in limitations: the effective rates,
however progressive, can never exceed the flat
rate; and more important, the marginal rate on
any added dollar of income for taxpayers above
the exemption level will always be the same because it will always be at the flat rate. To revert
to our example, the man with the $9,000 income
and the man with the $29,000 income will both
pay the same twenty-five cents on the last dollar
of their income.
There are possibly important political differences between degressive and graduated tax systems, also. The judgment that results in degression is a purely mathematical one based on revenue needs. It entails only a determination of the
level of the flat tax rate and where to set the
exemption, and does not in any way require a
judgment as to how much redistribution it is
desirable to impose upon those whose incomes
are above the exemption level. Further, in a degressive system the position of the wealthy is
anchored to that of other taxpayers in the society;
the only way under a degression pattern to raise
the marginal rate on the income of the wealthy
is to raise it across the board for all taxpayers
above the exemption level.
The fact that degression involves a progression
of effective rates above the exemption level does
not require us to alter any convictions we may
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happen to have as to the desirability of redistribution above the exemption level. One can
readily reconcile the distributional effects of degression with acceptance of the existing distribution of incomes above the exemption level. The
way to do this is to ignore that part of income
that is exempted, and to take into account for
purposes of comparison only the disparity among
"surplus" incomes. So viewed, the degressive tax
does not affect the relative shares of surplus income before and after taxes. To illustrate once
more with the $9,000 man and the $29,000 man,
each will retain after tax the same share-75 percent-of their respective surplus incomes; that is,
one will be left with $3,000 and the other with
$18,000. Perhaps the essential feature of graduated tax rates now emerges: they operate and
are intended to operate to effect redistribution
among "surplus" incomes.
But if we accept that degression neither adds
to nor subtracts from the case for progression via
graduated rates, are we left with only a trivial
question of policy to decide? Has the central
issue of tax justice been reduced to a technical
choice between progression via degression and
progression via graduated rates? It should be
clear that the answer is no. The much more fundamental question that is raised by juxtaposing
these two rate patterns is whether society should
concern itself with redistribution only insofar as
it is necessary to deal with poverty, or whether it
should extend its concern to inequalities of
"surplus" income. For it can deal with poverty
simply by means of the exemption that a degres.
sive system entails. And on the other hand, if it
has overcome poverty-which is to say, if it has
raised the level of income to a point where everyone has a "surplus"-it must decide whether
there is any justification for redistributing further.
Unfortunately, as soon as we put the question
in these terms, we discover that we have lost our
topic. To pass a judgment on whether a given
schedule of graduated rates achieves "tax justice"
from a redistributive perspective, we must resort
to criteria that lie altogether outside the province
14

of taxation. The rate schedule will be adjudged
fair insofar as it moves in the direction of what
one regards as a just distribution of the goods of
society; and, conversely, it will be adjudged unfair insofar as it moves away from the just distribution. What is at stake, and all that is at
stake, is the central and formidable question of
distributive justice in the society. If we can reach
a wide consensus on this underlying issue-a consensus that has always been most unlikely-the
judgment of the justice of the tax rate schedule
follows as a by-product. And more important, in
the absence of consensus on the underlying issue
of distributive justice, we are not equipped to
make any judgment at all about the justice of
the tax rates from this vantage point. To echo a
famous aphorism, we are at sea without a rudder
in selecting among possible patterns of graduated rates.
Seeing the distributive justice issue through tax
schedules does not reduce the perennial perplexities that attend any serious discussion of equality
and inequality among men. What can equality
of men mean in light of their manifest inequalities? How important is economic inequality
among the various manifestations of inequality?
How does one take into account the inequalities
of inheritance, both economic and cultural? Are
there significant functional aspects of inequalityespecially those that induce to work or investment? And if there are, how do we choose between increases in productivity and decreases in
inequality? To what extent can we correct for
the malfunctioning of the market as a distributor
of economic shares-the skewing due to monopoly, fraud, and uneven information? Is there
a sufficient relationship between that which the
society perceives as praiseworthy and that which
the market rewards? Is the focus to be on rewarding individual achievement-if indeed one
can isolate that in complex human affairs-or on
meeting common needs? Would we be more or
less aware of unpleasant inequalities in other
areas of life if there were greater economic
equality? What is the relationship between eco15

nomic inequality and the viability of political
democracy?
These questions, along with others they suggest, are important and worthy, and are directly
relevant to deciding how much progression is desirable in the tax system. But, we repeat, there is
nothing in the study of taxation itself that contributes to the discussion-except perhaps to provide a more congenial, less abrasive context in
which to confront issues of distributive justice.
All the perceptions that inform this core judgment of tax justice turn out to transcend taxation.
That such emphasis should be put on redistribution may seem surprising to many persons
today. To prior generations, certainly, it would
have seemed a strange basis from which to argue
tax rates. Neither in England nor in America
was progressive taxation introduced as a reform
aimed at redistribution. Its justifications were
sought on very different grounds. Indeed, the
effort to find some other rationale for going beyond a proportionate tax to graduated tax rates
marks one of the most curious episodes in modcrn intellectual history.
The effort seems to have been dominated by a
desire to stay within the principle that taxation
should be neutral. Argument took the form of
efforts to show why graduated rates were neutral
in an ultimate sense. Some ingenuity was required to sustain such contentions. Consider an
income tax. If the burdens imposed on taxpayers
are compared in dollars taken, the neutrality
principle would demand that the tax be proportionate to income. The man with ten times the
income should pay ten times the tax, but no
more. Since a graduated schedule of rates by
definition proposed to take more than ten times
the tax, its justification required that the true
comparison between taxpayers be in other than
dollar terms.
One approach was to compare taxpayers in
terms of benefits received from government. The
argument was that since the rich get more from
government than the less wealthy, they should
pay more in taxes. But this fell far short of what
16

was needed as a justification for progression. Over
and beyond the problems already noted in tracing
the particular benefits received from government
by individuals, there was a more decisive difficulty. Even if it is granted that the rich do receive greater benefits, to justify progression it is
necessary to establish that the benefits increase
more rapidly or steeply than does the income,
that the man with ten times the income has received more than ten times the benefits from government. Once this requirement is acknowledged,
the effort to justify progression by benefit must
fail; it can be sustained only by fiat.
Vulnerable as the benefit argument was, it is
further impeached when examined today in the
light of contemporary income maintenance and
welfare arrangements. Insofar as redistributive
objectives are being pursued by government, the
poor arguably emerge as the chief beneficiaries.
Another approach was to compare taxpayers
not in terms of dollars taken or benefits conferred
but in terms of the sacrifices imposed. While this
sacrifice approach had a much more elaborate and
elegant history, involving some of the great names
in moral philosophy and political economy, the
flaws that finally impeached it as a justification
turned out to be strikingly similar to those undermining argument from benefit theory.
Sacrifice analysis stemmed from the general
thesis of the utilitarians that problems of government policy should be worked out through a calculus of pleasures and pains. This seemed an
especially promising notion with respect to taxation, which was conventionally viewed as the
imposition of burdens. Neutrality in taxation
readily was translated into pursuit of equality of
sacrifice among different taxpayers. The key insight, amply corroborated by everyday experience,
was that goods-a third auto or a second house,
for example-had declining utility to the individual user. If this was true of particular goods,
presumably it was true also of money, the most
versatile and attractive "good" of all. Neutrality
of sacrifice seemed to call for taking more in taxes
from the rich than from the less rich. The larger
17

tax on the rich was thought to impose no greater
sacrifice on them in utility units than the lesser
tax imposed on the poor. This same line of
analysis seems always to justify taxing the rich
not merely more, but progressively more, calling
for tax rates graduated upward. When neutrality
is to be measured in terms of sacrifice, only such
graduated rates can be genuinely neutral.
The fascination of sacrifice theory is that all
efforts, and there were many, to refine and buttress this plausible intuition have served only to
impeach it. An early unsettling ambiguity was
whether the sacrifice that was called for was
an equal sacrifice. People with different total
amounts of income must have different total
amounts of "utility units." Assume that one
man's income totals 100 such units and another
man's income totals 10. To take 5 units from each
obviously imposes a heavier burden on the man
with only 10 units. Thus, if neutrality is the
goal, it would seem that proportionate, not equal,
sacrifice is called for. And, proportionate sacrifice seemed to lead directly to a justification of
progressive (i.e., graduated) taxation; assuming
any decline in the utility curve for money, only
graduated rates would appear to accomplish the
objective of proportionate sacrifice.
Framed this way, the problem moved into the
realm of mathematics and involved making a
complex comparison of two curves-the first, a
curve describing the rates of tax, and the second,
a utility curve for money. But once the mathematicians are called in and the intuitive comparison is made more precise, a surprising difficulty emerges. To yield progressive rates of tax,
even under proportionate sacrifice, the utility
curve for money has to decline very sharply.
Whatever the common sense of the notion that
money has some declining utility, it can hardly
be invoked to support the far more exacting notion that the order of the decline is very steep.
A new idea was then put forward that appeared to preserve the intuition as to utility without requiring so exact an understanding of the
money curve. The mistake, it was argued, had
18

been to treat proportionate sacrifice among individual taxpayers as the goal; the proper goal,
rather, was to minimize the total sacrifice of all
taxpayers in the society. Pursuit of minimum
sacrifice for the society as a whole called for taking in taxes only the least "painful" dollars. Any
degree of declining utility, however gentle the
slope of the curve, would dictate taking additional money from the more wealthy before the
state took any money from the less wealthy. Rigorous pursuit of such a formula obviously would
result in steeply progressive tax rates. And only
a little less obviously, it would result in the progressive equalizing of incomes after tax, since, so
long as A still had one dollar more than B, it
would produce less sacrifice to take that dollar
from A rather than to tax B.
This route to progression in taxation is astonishing. Its logic would dictate 100 percent marginal rates and the successive leveling of incomes
after tax. Indeed, any schedule of graduated
rates would come in through the back door, so
to speak. Such a schedule would reflect the need
to temper the otherwise 100 percent rates out of
regard for economic incentives. More remarkable
still, this argument arrives at progression from an
egalitarian premise of the oddest sort-the concern is not with distributive injustice but rather
with the objective of maximizing total utility in
the society by holding to a minimum the sacrifices imposed by taxation. Such a rationale is
altogether remote from any popular view of
the matter.
The radical sweep of the conclusion dictated by
the minimum sacrifice approach-however mild
the slope of the money utility curve-served to
call into doubt the key premise that money really
had declining utility. And on further thought it
became evident that this premise was most difficult to maintain. The utter versatility of money
for consumption purposes sets it apart from any
particular goods; with additional increments of
money, one does not have to resort to buying a
third car or a second house, but might elect to
acquire a first yacht (to select an offensive ex19

ample). Moreover, the declining utility notion
rested on analogies drawn entirely from the consumption of goods. But money to be useful does
not have to be spent; it can be saved or invested.
Who could say that the new enjoyment found in
savings or investment is not to be counted in the
utility of money?
Nor is this the only difficulty with the intuition
that money has declining utility. To be useful
to the argument at hand, the utility curve rnut
be assumed to be the same for each taxpayer, and
this requires that his subjective response to money
be somehow independent of his individual tastes
and character. Once critical scrutiny of the intuition is stimulated, one cannot help but note
how wide the variations among individual lifestyles really are; and one becomes introspectively
aware of how much one's own attitudes toward
money have varied over a lifetime.
Today, partly because utilitarianism has gone
out of fashion and partly because of these specific
difficulties with its application to taxation, there
is virtually no talk of sacrifice theory. The intuition about the declining utility of money has
not been put to rest, however. The old arguments
are continued at the popular level in a slightly
new guise. Taxes, we are repeatedly told, should
be progressive because they should be based on
"ability to pay." The content of the new term
is seldom defined, but a greater ability to pay
taxes must imply an ability to pay them more
effortlessly, with less of a burden. This in turn
leads directly back to the notion of paying them
with less sacrifice.
There have been ingenious efforts to avoid
such an equation of an ability to pay with the
idea of diminished sacrifice. It has been urged
that "money makes money," so that it becomes
progressively easier for the more wealthy to obtain their income; sacrifice is to be measured by
the effort involved in obtaining income rather
than the loss of enjoyment because it is taxed
away. Even if there were grounds for believing
that it is easier to earn the nth dollar than the
first dollar, which we seriously doubt, this ra20

tionale for progression suffers from precisely the
same defects that bedevil all sacrifice theory: the
inability to measure such a capacity with any accuracy, and the sheer implausibility that the
curve, this time keyed to ease of making money,
would be steep enough to yield a progressive tax.
Another line of thought has proceeded from
the notion that milk is more worthy socially than
champagne. The argument is that money to be
taken from the more wealthy in taxes would
otherwise be spent in less worthy ways than
money to be taken in taxes from the less wealthy.
This approach may avoid some difficulties of
sacrifice theory, but it does so at the price of ignoring the role of savings and investment, and
of resting its case on sumptuary judgments, which
are always dubious in a free society. And in any
case, it compares the wrong things. The distance
between milk and champagne, on which the rhetorical force depends, is the distance between incomes below the exemption or poverty level and
incomes above. What is needed, again, is not an
argument to support exemptions but to support
graduated rates of those incomes above the exemption level.
The elaborate efforts to find a rationale for
progression on grounds other than its redistributive effects include arguments derived from certain economics theories that flourished in the
recent past. Both distributive justice and sacrifice
perceptions were put to one side, and justification
was sought in support for mass purchasing power.
It was contended that a progressive tax would
deflect money from the group that would have
saved it to the group that would spend it. The
economic underpinnings of this line of analysis
have almost disappeared. The interesting thing
for present purposes is that, far from leading to
tax justice, it leads away. For if the analysis is applied consistently, it must call for the deliberate
use of regressive taxes whenever it is thought that
the society is spending too much and saving too
little.
The precise details of all this convoluted intellectual controversy are not important except
21

perhaps to the specialist. What is important is
the persistent effort to lower the visibility of the
redistributive function of graduated tax rates.
For at least a century, the overwhelming majority
of those who found a progressive tax system
attractive always did so on grounds other than
its redistributive impact. Only recently has a
willingness, and a desire, to confront the redistributive question begun to appear. Behind this
curious history one detects the ambivalence of
democratic society over distributive justice in
general, taxation apart. To put the matter perhaps too simply, the impulse to do something to
mitigate existing economic inequalities is inhibited by anxiety at the prospect of candid public
discussion and direct confrontation. Progressive
taxation offers a statesmanlike formula. It makes
it possible to adjust inequalities without talking
too explicitly. The public discussion of social
justice can be carried out in the less colorful
vocabulary of tax rates and tax bases.
If it is diplomatic to tie strategies of distributive justice to taxation, it is also quite peculiar
to do so. The potential for redistribution obviously depends on how much taxes will take out
of the private sector of the economy. When the
government is collecting only a modest total in
taxes, as was the case at the time the income tax
was enacted in 1913, the distributive leverage
provided via the tax system will necessarily be
small; and as the tax total rises, as it did for example during World War II, the redistributive
potentialities rise with it. As an egalitarian strategy, taxation is dependent on judgments about
the revenue level that may be unrelated to any
redistributive goal.
In any event, whenever serious change in the
level of revenue is proposed either upward or
downward, it serves to reopen the issue of how
progressive the system should be. Consider a proposal to reduce taxes dramatically. There would
inevitably arise a sharp question as to how the
reduction should be distributed. If all taxpayers
are given the same percentage of reduction in
their tax burdens, the ratios of income after tax
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will not be disturbed, and the revised tax schedules will be pursuing the same redistributive patterns as before. But the dollar amounts of tax
reduction given to the wealthy will be appreciably greater than the dollar amounts afforded
the less wealthy. This is certain to lead to clamor
that it is unfair and that it is surely the less
wealthy who are more deserving of the tax relief.
Much the same reactions will be invoked in the
converse case of a sudden need for significantly
higher tax revenues. The point has been taken
far enough to disclose how fragile any consensus
on the distributive aspects of taxation must in
the end be.

III Horizontal equity
While it is a widely held popular notion that
the rich escape paying a fair share of the tax
burden, the idea that taxation can be used as a
vehicle for redistributive equity has been of interest largely to experts and intellectuals. The
ordinary citizen's sense of injustice is more likely
to be stirred by other issues, those of horizontal
equity. These group about the simple perception
that people who are in similar circumstances
ought to bear a similar tax burden; it is unfair if
they do not. The redistributive effects of taxation, staying with the metaphor, can be said to
raise issues of vertical equity. They appear to be
a matter of tax justice only if one has in mind
standards of distributive justice.
It is easy to see why the vertical equity problem
does not preoccupy the ordinary citizen. It is
always difficult for him to assess his own total tax
burden, let alone that of others, given the multiplicity of taxes, the shifting of incidence, and
the ambiguity as to precisely which payments are
taxes. He is, moreover, likely to be most interested in comparing himself to people he thinks of
as his economic peers. But a perception of vertical equity requires comparison over a wide
range of economic levels. And the very idea of
graduated tax rates, and vertical equity, is imbedded in the mathematics of ratios, which are
inaccessible to many. In contrast, the ordinary
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citizen should find more congenial the comparisons involved in judgments of horizontal equity.
It is,after all, the cardinal idea of justice that like
cases be treated in like manner and unlike cases
in unlike manner. The idea is so basic it has the
quality of a self-evident axiom; it need not and
cannot be argued; it is the aspiration of all law
throughout history. Any deviations from like
treatment always involve an insistence that the
cases are not like in some relevant way. The very
idea of a rule of law lies in the commitment to
delineate which are the like cases.
Anything seen as a horizontal inequity in the
tax system is readily accepted as the peculiar
business of the tax system alone. In the most
narrow and literal sense, it is a matter of tax justice; the inequity can always be removed simply
by changing the tax system. Issues of vertical
inequity do not arise from the tax system, and
while they can be ameliorated through it, their
perception and resolution necessarily involve
matters more basic than taxes. The comparisons
invited by consideration of horizontal equity are
always finite. They always can be framed as oneto-one comparisons, and to make them, information outside the tax law does not seem to be
needed.
In the case of vertical equity, the choice of principle itself was historically the subject of deep
controversy, and the discussion of the topic consisted of a discussion of competing rationales for
proportional or progressive taxation. In the case
of horizontal equity, however, the choice of principle is perfectly clear and inarguable. All that
remains for discussion is the application of the
principle to a particular instance and the question of whether the cases are or are not similar.
But this is a matter that hardly lends itself to
general discussion, and it would seem there is
nothing further to be said on it at a general level.
A nagging question of some generality nevertheless remains. Why do controversies over horizontal inequities in the tax system so firmly persist? Why, in a democratic regime at least, does
not the tax system, through public debate and
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criticism, work itself pure of these defects?
One reason is that through technical errors
or oversights in drafting, or through failure to
anticipate certain consequences, arbitrary distinctions from time to time creep into the tax
laws. Although virtually no one will defend
them, they tend to persist because of general
inertia, and because they are too insignificant to
have any political resonance. These are matters
that normally must wait upon a broad technical
revision of the tax law.
Perhaps another reason is that in some instances efforts to eliminate horizontal inequities
will themselves result in fresh injustices. A ready
example may be drawn from the real property
tax. Even if it is agreed that property A is overvalued for tax purposes and overtaxed as compared to property B, and this discrepancy has
continued for many years, the correction may
present a stubborn problem where property A
has changed hands in the market while the discrimination existed. Market prices for land reflect the relative tax burdens on the land; hence,
assuming that properties A and B are otherwise
comparable, the price of the overtaxed property
A will reflect its extra tax burden, and be lower.
If now the tax assessment on property A is corrected and brought in line, the result will be to
increase the market value of the property and in
this respect confer a windfall on its current
owner. There is no way of correcting the injustice to the real victim, the seller of property A.
Then there will be occasions on which the
question whether we should give greater recognition to the similarities or the differences between cases remains somehow intrinsically controversial. Law is never simply taxonomic. For
example, when it comes to the comparison of
earned to unearned income, which is a matter of
perennial debate in connection with the income
tax, the question whether these two kinds of income present like cases translates into the question of whether they should be taxed in the same
way. They are both alike and different in obvious respects. Any effort to resolve the question
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of whether they should be taxed according to
their similarity or according to their difference
must soon implicate a wide range of deep value
judgments.
Another intrinsically controversial instance is
afforded by the problem of selecting the tax unit
for a progressive income tax. In the search for
like cases, is comparison of taxpayers to be made
on the basis of individuals, the marital unit, the
immediate family, or the de facto sociological
household? There are of course numerous similarities and differences among these various
households. Since the tax is on persons and not
on things, the system must choose at the outset
whether and how to group the persons, and the
choice will have tax dollar consequences. Under
graduated rates, distribution of the tax burden
will be very different depending on whether a
husband and wife are seen as two wholly distinct
taxpayers each with his income, or as a simple
unit with one aggregate income, or as two taxpayers each having half the family income. In
making a determination of this matter, one
might want to take into account social policies,
such as encouraging marriage or conceivably discouraging communal living. But even if the legislature were wholly indifferent as to these specific policies, it would still have the problem of
selecting the tax unit. The unit remains a structural feature of the system, generating controversy
that cannot be eliminated.
But by far the most striking source of persisting
controversy over horizontal equity comes from
what might be called deliberate departures from
the canon that like cases be treated in like manner. These departures are dictated largely by
policies that lie outside taxation itself, and that
reflect the use of taxation as a tactic for promoting particular social or political or economic
goals. Take the income tax portions of the Internal Revenue Code. If the statute were judged
on its face, one would be hard put to defend the
equity of the longstanding preferential treatment
associated with such features as the exemption of
interest received from state and municipal bonds,
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deductions for accelerated depreciation or amortization, high depletion deductions for oil and
gas, deductions for charitable contributions, credit against taxes for investment, low tax rates on
income from export operations, deductions for
certain state and local taxes, and the reduced tax
rates on income in the form of capital gains. In
each of these instances, the argument for the preferential treatment appeals to objectives that are
not explicit in the statute, such as stimulating oil
exploration, encouraging philanthropy, increasing the formation of capital, and stimulating the
formation of capital goods.
Today, departures from horizontal equity furnish much of the fuel for public debate over the
fairness of the tax system. They present a complex case for appraisal in terms of justice because
the statute is not, of course, to be judged on its
face. Those not persuaded to the wisdom of the
specific policy being fostered through the tax system will perceive the discrimination simply as
the arbitrary favoring of one group of taxpayers
over others. Those persuaded of the merits of
the specific policy will see the differences in treatment as having a sensible purpose. For the unpersuaded, the difference in treatment poses a
question of tax injustice, but for the persuaded it
is not, it should be pointed out, an instance of tax
justice so much as an instance of overriding public policy. The persuaded are willing that on
these occasions considerations of horizontal justice be subordinated to other ends of the society.
But even some of those persuaded of the specific policy may see the deliberate difference in
the treatment as an injustice. Taxation almost
never is the only effective way to implement the
specific policy. When it is not, we confront the
generic policy issue of whether to use the tax
system for extrinsic purposes. Those who feel
that it is in general a mistake to resort to taxation
as a tactic of influencing behavior may well continue to feel that way even though they favor the
specific policy being advanced. Accordingly, they
will find the tax discrimination unjustified and
arbitrary and hence see it as a tax injustice.
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We meet here what is today, among students of
taxation, one of the most actively debated issues,
especially as it applies to the income tax. An
emerging view is that whatever the differential
treatment has caused the government to surrender in taxes by not collecting more than it
does in taxes from the favored group is equivalent to a direct expenditure by government. If
the government elects to "forego" a given number
of dollars in revenue to encourage, for example,
those engaged in oil exploration, it is said that
this is very like an expenditure of that number
of dollars in support of oil ventures. The policy
issue so framed is whether the "subsidy" should
be given through the "tax expenditure" or in one
of the other possible ways.
The metaphor of tax expenditure, although
helpful and dramatic, is hard to confine. It can
be quickly extended by adopting the premise that
as there is virtually nothing government could
not tax, anything it does not tax is a tax expenditure. The consequence is that the society is
inundated with tax expenditures. To take an
extreme illustration: the federal government
could have, but has not, added a consumption tax
to the income tax; to conclude that this restraint
represents an "expenditure" on behalf of consumption does not advance analysis.
But vulnerable or not, the metaphor of tax
expenditure does serve to capture and to isolate
some key issues in using the tax system for extrinsic policy purposes. There are important
differences between a literal expenditure and a
tax expenditure. The tax expenditure will necessarily be hidden and may to some extent escape
notice; the amount will be uncertain and will
fluctuate with other changes, such as in tax rates.
Because the item is not budgeted as an expenditure, it will not come up for periodic review and
will tend to slip into a more or less permament
expenditure. Usually it will be difficult to know
just who is receiving the subsidy. Taken together, these characteristics mean that use of tax
expenditures will always involve some degree of
political irresponsibility; it will blunt or deflect
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confrontation over the merits of the specific policy, its duration, its magnitude, and the assessment of how well the tax incentive is achieving
the avowed purpose.
When the tax utilized to finance extrinsic policies is one with graduated rates, a whole new
series of problems arises, intimately related to the
concern with tax justice. Tax expenditures, under graduated rates, generate a number of secondary and often unwanted consequences. Any
preferential treatment in the form of a "bargain"
rate, or an exclusion, or a deduction will save
more in tax dollars for those in a higher than
for those in a lower marginal rate bracket. The
inducement to take advantage of the preferential treatment thus increases directly as income
reaches the higher tax brackets. Moreover, the
ability to take such advantage will depend in
considerable part on mobility of the taxpayer's
economic position: not everyone is equally ready
to invest funds in oil exploration. As more tax
expenditure features are introduced into the tax
structure, the law becomes more complicated and
less accessible, and the possibilities of combining
specific preferential treatments create a greater
potential for tax savings. Over time, the wealthier, who have the most to gain from tailoring
their economic behavior, will recruit and utilize
a cadre of professionals who are expert in realizing that potential.
Evaluating deliberate departures from horizontal equity thus requires a complex calculus.
The one-to-one comparison involved in testing
whether like cases are being treated alike becomes heavily overlaid with additional factors.
Something simpler and more personal may be
required to trigger the sense of tax injustice in
the ordinary citizen. That something frequently
appears associated with the slightly tainted complaint that, while the tax system is manipulatable,
the ordinary citizen does not have an equal opportunity to take advantage of it. We would
hazard the unflattering guess that such a citizen
would be far less vigorous in his complaints about
tax avoidance possibilities if only he had an equal
29

chance to utilize them.
In the end, departures from horizontal equity
impede the effort to achieve vertical equity, and
conversely, the more intense the pursuit of vertical equity -meaning the greater the progressivity of the tax-the higher the "stakes" become
for departures from horizontal equity. The result of the complicated adjustments and distinctions of the tax statute may well be that some
of the very wealthy pay a smaller percentage of
their income in taxes, and even a smaller number
of dollars, than the less wealthy. It is when this
happens that a sense of grievance arises. The vast
majority of taxpayers can hardly avoid a simple
and blunt comparison with themselves, testing
the justice of the tax system. What sparks indignation is not, ironically, that the horizontal
equities have been violated but that there has
been a gross departure from expectations as to
vertical equity. There is then a popular outcry
about "loopholes."

IV Administrative inequities
Discussions of horizontal and vertical equitythe anatomy of justice in taxation-deal with
substantive provisions of the tax statute. They
miss, however, an important component of the
popular sense of tax injustice-those grievances
that arise from procedural aspects or, better, from
the law in action.
There are the sheer and obvious irritations
with bureaucracy. One could array types of taxes
on an axis measuring degrees of contact between
citizen and government official. It would be a
fair guess that the less sensitive the tax to considerations of equity, the better it would score.
A flat all-inclusive sales tax, necessa ily regressive,
would entail on the side of the consumer-taxpayer
no contact with, and no irritation over, government bureaucracy. Taxes, such as the income tax,
based on personal situations rather than on
things or transactions, invite the greatest complications for the ordinary citizen. The more
sensitive a personal tax becomes to considerations
of vertical or horizontal equity, the more complex
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and irritatingits administration.
One can isolate various other sources of irritation with taxation in operation, again using
the income tax as the example. Since it is selfassessing-a great and undervalued decency-this
tax requires the taxpayer to answer to government annually a formidable questionnaire about
his financial affairs, and imposes on him a considerable burden of record keeping. The complexity can be so great that the taxpayer may well
feel that his taxes are based on answers to questions he does not understand. If, nevertheless, he
goes it alone, he risks making mistakes in calculating his taxes; if he seeks assistance from government officials, he risks not only frustration
with bureaucracy but also getting biased answers;
and if he employs a private intermediary-a
lawyer, an accountant, or one of the burgeoning
commercial return preparers-he may well be irritated by the social costs.
Now that the income tax has become a mass
tax, there are also the difficulties with enforcement and policing. As a practical matter, only a
fraction of all self-assessed tax returns can be
scrutinized for content each year. This fact is
apt to evoke suspicions on the part of taxpayers.
If one happens to be selected for direct scrutiny,
he may feel he was unfairly singled out. The very
process of scrutiny may appear deeply intrusive
to him and unfairly to impeach his integrity.
Should he become aware of how small a percentage of returns are actually audited each year,
he may feel that the system permits the dishonesty
of other taxpayers to flourish. His confidence that
errors will be detected and tax cheaters will be
caught is unlikely to be sturdy. Everyone can
understand that uneven enforcement of the tax
system is a clear departure from the canon that
like cases be treated alike.
The enforcement problems of the income tax
go beyond the familiar perplexities of discretion
and the rule of law. Under self-assessment, the
income tax emerges as an honor system, but because of the enormous stakes involved, it is an
honor system only within limits. It dare not take
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the taxpayer altogether at his word as to how
much he owes in taxes, and it cannot, and perhaps dare not, question all taxpayers with equal
persistence and intensity about their affairs.
When the format of a tax does not utilize the
honor system but relies upon the findings of government officials, as for example with valuations
for real or personal property taxes, the focus of
grievance shifts. There is so large a component
of discretion in the valuation of real property
that the tax levy is always vulnerable to the
charge that like cases are in fact not being treated
alike. In the case of personal property, the valuation process is not only discretionary but inescapably intrusive. Indeed, in some communities
enforcement of the personal property tax became
so patently partial and uneven that it was finally
decided to abandon the tax altogether. The selfassessment feature of the income tax may not be
merely a matter of style; a government-assessed
tax on income would be surely so deep an invasion of privacy as to be intolerable.
Another set of grievances arises not because of
what is taking place on the tax side of the government ledger but because of what is happening
on the expenditure side. This raises tax justice
questions in the limited sense that the grievance
affects the paying of taxes.
Reactions in the United States to the Vietnam
War suggest the possibilities of using the tax system as a vehicle for protesting a particular variety
of government activity and expenditure. Thoreau's classic gesture, after all, was a refusal to pay
taxes. Some of the grumbling over property
taxes these days undoubtedly stems from dissatisfaction with the high level of expenditures on
education. But the concern need not be so sharply
focused on particular expenditures: it may reflect
merely a diffuse complaint that taxes are unjustly
high because government is so inefficient and
wasteful. The complaint may go beyond this and
take us back to redistributive considerations. To
the extent that government expenditures represent welfare measures and transfer payments to
the poor, antagonism to the level of taxes can be
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read as antagonism to excesses in the pursuit of
redistribution. This reaction can spread to all
taxes whatever their form or the pattern of rate
structure.

V The political dimension
In a democracy, taxes are ultimately set by
operation of majority rule. Does this circumstance have a bearing on issues of tax justice?
Some have urged that it provides a reason for not
pursuing vertical equity through taxation. The
principle of majority vote, it is argued, cannot
be trusted with setting graduated rates under a
system of private property and universal suffrage. Graduated rates necessarily afford the less
wealthy, who will be the more numerous, the opportunity to vote taxes they will not have to bear
themselves onto the minority of more wealthy.
The conclusion-dictated, it should be noted, by
concern for political responsibility, and not by
argument from justice-is that tax rates should
never be graduated upward. An argument for
proportionate taxation is thus reached via the
political route.
Despite the elegance of the argument, the arresting fact is that the predicted outcome seems
never to have occurred in our society. Somehow,
given a substantial middle class, the majoritarian
principle has proved sturdy and flexible enough
to handle the voting of taxes in a not altogether
irresponsible fashion.
It has been also argued that, at least in matters
of taxation, there can be too much clarity and
coherence for the democratic process. Serious
political frictions would appear if we somehow
reached the millenium with a single comprehensive income tax as the only exercise of the taxing
power. Under such a coherent scheme, the perception and awareness of the issues of tax justice
would be greatly enhanced, but the ease of reaching a political concensus on taxes would be impaired. There may be unsuspected political
strengths in what appear to be weaknesses, complexities, and confusions in the current system.
This contention seems at best weak. Although
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it may have some special bite in the context of
taxation, it is nothing more than an application
of a very general and very debatable thesis asserting a benign role for confusion and ambiguity
in keeping democracy viable.
Finally, there are those who would short-circuit
all the considerations we have been wrestling
with in this essay and insist that the only content to the term tax justice is that the tax burdens
have been voted by the majority. In this view,
the exclusive criterion of tax justice is the procedural one that the electorate and its representatives are functioning according to procedural
and constitutional proprieties. Just as many issues of taste should be left to the economic marketplace, so it is argued that these value issues
should be left to the political marketplace. A just
tax is seen as the exact analogue of a just price.
This in one sense is undeniably true. Departures from political proprieties in setting taxes, as
the experience of the American Revolution reminds us, provide the most fundamental instances
of tax injustice. But put thus bluntly, the contention that what is just is simply what is correctly
done misses the function of normative discussions in taxation. The crystallizing of political
strengths through the voting process presupposes
that public discussion of policy has taken place.
In any such discussion of tax policy, the consideration of tax justice will necessarily be salient,
and at the very least will provide the rhetoric that
all sides are obligated to employ.
NOTE TO THE READER
The questions raised by Professors Kalven and Blum are
dealt with, directly or indirectly, by many of the authors
in GBWW. In the Syntopicon, see Chapter 31, GovERNMENT, Topic 4, and Chapter 99, WEALTH, Topic 9e (2).
for writings on taxation in general. See also Chapter 42,
JUSTICE, Topic 5, which lists writings on the relation betwccn justice and equality (and inequality), and Topic Ba,
where writings concerned with the just distribution of
economic goods are noted. Chapter 76, QUANTITY, lists
writings on the relation between equality and proportion
(Topic lb).
In GGB, see the essay "Of Taxes" by David Hume in
Vol. 7, pp. 85-88.
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